United States Policy and Norwegian Commercial
Whaling: A Cooperative Approach
Jamie Nystrom*
“There go the ships: there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to
play therein.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Both the United States and Norway have a long history of commercial whaling, but the mantle of dominance in the whaling world passed
from the United States to Norway in the mid-nineteenth century. 2 As
demand for whale-based products declined in the United States over the
past century, and environmentalism and conservationism became more
popular public ideologies, the United States shifted from a pro-whaling
nation to, effectively, an anti-whaling nation. 3 Norway, however, has
continued to be the only nation that openly engages in commercial whaling for profit,4 albeit on a smaller scale in comparison to historical prac-

* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2014 .
1. Psalms 104:26 (King James).
2 . See J.N. TONNESSEN & A.O. JOHNSEN, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING 11 (R.I.
Christophersen trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1982).
3. See Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White
Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 404 (2009).
4. See Cliff M. Stein, Comment, Whales Swim for Their Lives As Captain Ahab Returns in a
Norwegian Uniform: An Analysis of Norway’s Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 155, 156 (1994).
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tice.5 The United States’ past efforts to pressure Norway to ban whaling
have been largely unsuccessful.6 The best way for the United States to
meet long-term conservation goals with respect to imposing international
regulation on Norwegian commercial whaling is to change from its current policy—trying to get Norway to stop its formal objection to the International Whaling Commission’s (IWC) moratorium on commercial
whaling—to working cooperatively with Norway through international
law by supporting a lift on the ban and finding a scientifically sustainable
quota for the yearly catch.
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of commercial whaling,
the events that led to the formation of the IWC, and the eventual ban on
commercial whaling. Next, Part III discusses how previous attempts under international and domestic law to force Norway to sign on to the ban
have been ineffective and may possibly contribute to the disintegration of
the IWC as a functioning international body. Part IV argues that, as a
major force in international law and policy, the United States has an opportunity to meet its own conservation goals while cooperatively working with Norway to agree to scientifically sustainable quotas in a way
that will preserve the IWC as the international body governing whaling.
Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL WHALING
A brief history of commercial whaling is required to understand
why whaling is important to Norway as part of its cultural heritage, why
international regulation of whaling is necessary, and the present difficulties in regulating whaling.
A. From Old to Modern Whaling
Whaling is an ancient practice because whales have many uses as a
natural resource. Whales are massive aquatic mammals. The blue whale
is “the largest mammal that has ever existed on this earth.”7 The minke
whale is primarily hunted today because it is a viable alternative to tak-

5. See A.W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium and
Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 400 (2005)
(noting that the declining trend is subject to variance).
6. See Sonja Marta Halverson, Note, Small State with a Big Tradition: Norway Continues
Whaling at the Expense of Integration and Nordic Cooperation, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
121, 128–29 (2004).
7. TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 3. The blue whale can weigh up to 150 tons and
produce fifty-two tons of oil, weighing about as much as twenty-five elephants or 150 big oxen. Id.
at 5.
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ing larger protected species.8 Whales have a great variety of uses because
almost every part has value, ranging from food, soap, and perfume, to
margarine, paint, and industrial lubricants.9 As a result, it is unsurprising
that they have been sought after as a commercial resource.10 Norway’s
primary interest has been commercial whaling for profit from the abovementioned industrial uses.11 Commercial whaling with the primary purpose of attaining whale meat for human consumption, however, occurs
only in Japan12—a phenomenon that has led to an entirely different set of
international legal issues, which is beyond the scope of this Note.
Whaling as a practice dates back to prehistoric eras13 but can be divided into two general periods: old and modern. Larger-scale, organized
efforts under old whaling are attributed first to the Basques in the Bay of
Biscay circa the eleventh century C.E.14 As the centuries passed, methods
improved, boats grew in size, and the range of whaling had crossed the
Atlantic, reaching the Arctic by the seventeenth century.15 Modern whaling began in the 1860s and is marked by changes in techniques, technologies, and the species of whales principally hunted.16
One of the major distinctions between old and modern whaling is
that “right whales” were sought after in old whaling, whereas “rorqual
whales” are prized in modern whaling. 17 Right whales were easier to
catch than rorqual whales because they were slow moving and their bodies continued to float after they were killed; it was not until more modern

8. See id. at 5. Whales are divided into two main groups: whalebone and toothed. Aside from
sperm whales, which are toothed, most commercial whaling is based around whalebone whales,
which are divided into three general families: right whales, gray whales, and rorqual whales; minkes
are rorquals. Id. at 3–5.
9. See Lisa Kobayashi, Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on Commercial Whaling As the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling, 29 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y J. 177, 179 (2006).
10. See id.
11. See generally TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2.
12. See id. at 52–53.
13. PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF
WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING, VOL. 1, 65
(Oceana Pub. 1985). Whale drawings have been found in Norway dating back to nearly 2200 B.C.E.,
suggesting hunting may have occurred. Id.
14 . Such early efforts were mostly confined to coastal areas and small watercraft. See
Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 389.
15. ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD POLITICS 150 (Continuum Int’l Publishing Group, 2d ed. 2007). The English and Dutch were major whalers by this time,
hunting primarily in Arctic waters. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 389.
16. See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 3.
17. See id. at 6. Right whales were named as such because they were the “right” whale to
catch. Id.
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techniques and technology developed that the faster rorquals were able to
be killed and caught before they sank.18
By the time Americans became involved in the whaling industry in
the mid-eighteenth century, the British, French, and Germans had already
hunted right whales in the Bay of Biscay and Greenland to near extinction.19 The Americans then led the way to new grounds in the Southern
Hemisphere, but between the time of the United States’ Civil War and
the end of the nineteenth century, whaling had died out as an industry in
the United States.20 The near-extinction of right whales by the latter half
of the nineteenth century made the catching of rorquals essentially imperative for the industry to continue.21
The solution to the rorqual problem would soon propel Norway to
dominance in the whaling industry and give rise to the need for regulation. The father of modern whaling—who saved the industry from the
crisis of the depletion of right whales and enabled the taking of
rorquals—was a Norwegian named Svend Foyn, who began experimenting with new methods off the northern coasts of Finnmark in the 1860s.22
The Foyn method was novel in that it used steam-driven whaling boats
and grenade-tipped harpoons fired from cannons with a line connecting
the harpoon to the ship.23 These technological innovations gave Norway
an unparalleled advantage in the whaling industry, and as the industry
spread globally through the 1920s, Norway quickly became the industry
leader: first exhausting North Atlantic stocks, then declaring a moratorium in all Norwegian waters, and finally becoming the first nation to start
operations in the Antarctic.24 One of the important changes that kept the
use of whale oil relevant in the twentieth century was the invention of
18. See id.
19. See Stein, supra note 4, at 158–59.
20. See id. As the Industrial Revolution spurred economic changes in the United States towards
internal expansion and development of its vast land resources, skilled workers onshore could earn
two to three times the wage of a whaler, and as a result, its whaling fleet lost its supply of workers.
See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 12–13. At the same time, Norway experienced the
second largest population growth in Europe (following Ireland) and pushed its development outwards, resulting in a stream of immigrants to the United States and a ready supply of young men to
man the merchant and whaling fleets who could earn two to three times as much wages at sea as
opposed to onshore. Id.
21. See id. at 6. Interestingly enough, no whaling was carried out from Norwegian shores in the
middle of the nineteenth century. Id. There seems to be no special circumstances that made it inevitable that Norway would become the world leader in whaling. Id. at 11.
22. See id. at 6–7.
23. See id.
24. See Stein, supra note 4, at 160–61. Given the presence of Norwegian whalers in the Arctic
and Antarctic, the prominence of Norwegian explorers in the same regions seems less surprising. See
TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 71.
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hydrogenation, which meant that whale oil could be used in important
products like margarine and industrial lubricants, and not only the traditional uses like lighting, lubrication, and soap.25
Modern whaling had thus gone through two initial stages—the
Finnmark Coast period (1864–1904) and the global expansion period
(1883–1924)—and moved into the final “pelagic” stage (1925–present),
which is characterized by whaling in the open ocean with floating factories, compared to shore-based whaling, where the carcasses would be
dragged back to a shore facility for processing. 26 The newly effective
methods of whaling would result in attempts by national governments
and, eventually, international bodies to regulate the industry.
B. The Rise of International Regulation
Regulation in the whale industry likewise followed the development of modern whaling in three general stages: free whaling; local or
national regulation; and international regulation. 27 The effects of free
whaling were seen above with the near extinction of right whales, but
when similar signs began to appear in rorqual stocks, history was not
doomed to repeat itself. Depletion of stocks in the North Atlantic spurred
the Scandinavian nations to national-level regulation of the whaling industry in the early twentieth century, with the purpose of preserving
whale stocks as a valuable resource.28 As management of global marine
resources began to become a relevant state interest in the early twentieth
century, the states with the greatest interest in collecting whales became
the states that managed them.29
National and international regulation of whales was largely ineffective because of the foundations of the legal status of whales as a form of
resource. A state’s jurisdiction over coastal waters historically only extended three nautical miles from shore. Beyond that point, the waters
were aqua nullius, meaning that the resources belonged to no one and
were free for the taking in essentially an anarchic zone of the high sea.30
25. See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 7.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 9.
28. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 391–92. Measures included the first ever moratorium on
whaling by Iceland for twenty years in 1915 and laws in Norway limiting the number of stations and
catchers. See id.
29. See id. at 392. For example, the International Council for Exploration of the Sea created the
Whaling Commission, which in 1927 tried to regulate the open slaughter approach to whaling unsuccessfully. See id. at 392–93.
30. See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 8–9. States applied the doctrine mare liberum
(freedom of access to the seas), which had been formulated by Grotius in 1608 in order to justify the
right of the Dutch to sail freely to the East Indies, but had been misinterpreted to apply to fishing
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Because no state could regulate the high seas and whales were viewed as
a common resource from which no one could be excluded, the resource
was prone to overexploitation. Under these circumstances, the short-term
incentive was to maximize profits from the resource before others depleted it, rather than to manage it for long-term benefit.31 Given the lack
of short-term incentives to cooperate, it is no surprise that national and
private attempts at self-regulation were doomed to fail. Indeed, even
most attempts at international regulation have failed miserably.
The whaling industry has not been able to limit takings of whales
very well for a variety of reasons: inadequate scope of the regulations,
lack of adequate scientific knowledge, important whaling states not cooperating, lack of enforcement, no international observers, and a general
lack of interest by the international community.32 The whaling industry
and various nations were stirred to action in the 1930s when the catch of
blue whales had increased so much that it depressed global oil prices,
spurring the whaling industry to realize that the existing various nationallevel controls were ineffective and that whales needed to be kept from
extinction in order to maintain profits.33 In response, in 1931, the League
of Nations created the first international body to regulate whaling: the
first Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Convention). 34 This
Convention applied to all waters of the member states, enforced vessel
licensing requirements, and also exempted aboriginal takings. 35 Even
though the Convention was an achievement in that it was the first time
conservation was applied to whaling on a global scale, it failed because
unlike the older, established industry leaders, such as Norway and the
United States, the newer, large whaling powers of Japan, Germany, and
the USSR all refused to sign on because it was not in their economic interest.36
Frustrated by the Convention’s inability to effectively regulate, the
industry created a cartel-like private organization known as the Internarights that Grotius recognized as exhaustible and, therefore, subject to control. See BIRNIE, supra
note 13, at 88; see also generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT
WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (Ralph Van Deman
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1608). The result of this state of international law gave
rise to such quintessential phenomena as the golden age of piracy in the Caribbean and privateering
contracts, both of which are beyond the scope of this Note.
31. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 390–91. The fight to secure relative gains of a scarce resource led to a classic instance of the “tragedy of the commons.” Id.
32. See BIRNIE, supra note 13, at 129–30.
33. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 393.
34. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 155 L.N.T.S. 349.
35. Id. at arts. 1, 3, 8, 9.
36. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 393–94.
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tional Association of Whaling Companies, which attempted to limit
global production of whale oil in order to keep prices in check.37 The
first attempt by the major Antarctic whaling companies at self-regulation
was defeated in the 1933–1934 season due to defections by two British
companies and one Norwegian company; so naturally, all restraint was
lost the next season and the total number of takings increased. 38 The
plans of mice and men, it seems.
In 1937, another attempt was made at international regulation: the
International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, along with a
single protocol to it amended a year later.39 Once again, these were largely ineffective because they were not ratified by all the major whaling
states. 40 In the wake of an additional failed attempt at regulation, the
catch in the 1937–1938 season reached yet another all-time high.41
By the mid-1930s, Norway’s dominance in the whaling industry
was uncontested.42 Norway was responsible for nearly half of the takings
and oil production, and most men employed in the industry—even at
companies not controlled by Norwegians—were Norwegian.43 Not even
World War II put a complete stop to Norwegian whaling efforts, but the
post-war years would see Japan and the USSR overtake Norway’s leading position.44
C. Formation of the International Whaling Commission
The realization that diminishing stocks would mean not only the extinction of whales but also the extinction of the whaling industry spurred
all sides to come together to treat whales not as resources of individual
states, but as a shared global resource.45 The general respite granted to
whales by the onset of World War II may have kept some major whale
species from extinction as the catch level fell to ten percent of pre-war
levels.46 Before the end of the war, the whaling nations agreed to limit
the size of the catch by using a “standardized” measure: the Blue Whale
Unit (BWU), which was a measure of the amount of oil that could be
37. See id. at 394.
38. See id.
39. International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 79;
Protocol Amending the International Agreement of June 8th, 1937, for the Regulation of Whaling,
June 24, 1938, 196 L.N.T.S. 131.
40. See SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 18 (1985).
41. See BIRNIE, supra note 13, at 129.
42. See Stein, supra note 4, at 162.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 162–63.
45. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 397.
46. Id. at 396.
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taken regardless of which species it came from, with one BWU being the
amount of oil that would come from one blue whale.47 Shortages of edible fats prompted the victorious Allies to prepare for orderly post-war
takings, agreeing to limit the catch to 16,000 BWUs for the 1945–1946
season; however, due to sharp demand, the BWU limit quickly increased
to 43,378 BWUs by the following two seasons.48
As the United States emerged from the ashes of World War II as a
new world leader intent on creating a new world political order in its
own image, it took charge in looking at the issues surrounding commercial whaling by calling for a new international conference in Washington, D.C.49 Following the United States’ leadership, fifteen whaling nations signed on to the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (ICRW) in 1946, including, for the first time, a major whaling
state that had previously refused to sign international agreements: the
USSR.50 Norway was a founding member and has remained a member
since 1946.51
The purpose of the ICRW, as was stated in the preamble, was to
“provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.”52 Although the
preamble mostly contains language couched in terms of the industry’s
interests,53 the preamble also included for the first time some important
conservationist language: “Recognizing the interest of the nations of the
world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources
represented by the whale stocks.” 54 This signaled a change in the approach the world community would take to whaling regulation; the reasons for regulating were no longer simply to control competition and
maintain profits.
The ICRW created the International Whaling Commission (IWC)55
to implement the economic and environmental goals of the ICRW.56 The
47. Id. The problems inherent in such a measure are easily imagined when one considers the
variance in size of any species of whale.
48. Id. at 397.
49. Id. at 397–98.
50. See Stein, supra note 4, at 164. The fifteen member states were: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chili, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa,
the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
51. See Stein, supra note 4, at 164.
52. ICRW, supra note 50.
53. E.g., id. (“Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if whaling
is properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the numbers of whales which may be captured without endangering these natural resources.”).
54. Id.
55. See id. at art. III.
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IWC Schedule, which was created under the ICRW, set limits on catches
but was not directly enforceable by the IWC.57 Rather, the ICRW provided that each contracting government would take appropriate enforcement
measures against persons and vessels under its own maritime jurisdiction.58 An important provision was that any nation could join the IWC if
it agreed to abide by the ICRW,59 which reflects a view that whales are
the property of the entire world and not just whaling nations.60 While the
members of the IWC may amend the Schedule, they may not amend the
Convention itself.61 The binding regulations are made in the Schedule,
which can only be amended by a three-fourths vote.62 Such amendments
must be “necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum
utilization of the whale resources.”63 The Schedule regulates five general
categories: (1) quota limitations based on size and species; (2) open and
closed areas; (3) seasonal and regional limitations for pelagic hunting;
(4) treatment after killing; and (5) supervision and control. 64 Amendments are supposed to be based on scientific findings, so in theory, both
the United States and Norway agree that the findings of the Scientific
Committee of the IWC should be the foundation of all regulation.65
Another important provision is that member states can “opt out” of
any provision if they file a timely objection to an amendment.66 The IWC
can also make non-binding recommendations to member states on matters that relate to whales, whaling, and the object and purpose of the
ICRW.67 Armed with such tools, the IWC thus set out to regulate commercial whaling, which would not initially prove to be any more successful than previous attempts.

56. See Halverson, supra note 6, at 124.
57. ICRW, supra note 50, at art. I.
58. Id. at art. IX.
59. Id. at art. X(4).
60. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 399.
61. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 189.
62. ICRW, supra note 50, at arts. I, III(2), V(1).
63. Id. at art. V(2).
64. Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 190.
65. ICRW, supra note 50, at art. V(2). However, actual disagreement over what constitutes
scientific findings in the IWC suggests that the language of the Convention is somewhat hortatory on
this point. See infra Part IV.
66. ICRW, supra note 50, at art. V(3).
67. Id. at art. VI.
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D. Moratorium to Present
Regulation of the whaling industry in the post-war years generally
failed because the quota system was inaccurate, it was difficult to divide
between the whaling states, and the states loathed giving up their preexisting allocations; therefore, whale populations continued to diminish,
raising concerns in the larger global community.68 As the industrial needs
for whale oil were replaced by petroleum products, attitudes towards
whaling shifted in many nations that did not have a history of consuming
whale meat.69
Starting in the 1970s, environmentalism grew as a movement and
soon turned its attention to whaling. 70 Various environmental groups
were largely effective in destroying the market for whaling products by
the use of various organized efforts, including international conventions,
boycotts, and propaganda against whale products.71 Such efforts at bringing public sympathies worldwide to the side of anti-whaling nations,
coupled with recruiting efforts in the IWC, shifted the makeup of the
IWC. By the early 1980s, anti-whaling forces in the IWC constituted a
three-quarters majority, and under United States’ leadership, it imposed a
total moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982.72
The moratorium affected the nations opposed to it in various ways.
Japan initially filed a formal objection, but withdrew its objections after
caving into pressure from the United States, which promised not to use
punitive trade sanctions under its domestic law that it had designed as an
enforcement mechanism of the IWC.73 Japan currently whales, but ostensibly for “research purposes.”74 The former USSR (now the Russian Federation) also objected to the moratorium, and while it never officially
withdrew its objection, it nevertheless ceased all operations in 1987 and
generally shifted its policies towards conservation. 75 Norway filed a
timely objection and continued to object to measures such as an IWC
decision to protect minke whales on the basis that the decision was not
68. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 193.
69. See id. at 194–95.
70. These movements can be drawn into three general groups: conservationists, preservationists, and animal welfare activists. See id. at 196. Conservationists are concerned with sustainable
practices of exploiting natural resources, preservationists reject any scientific evidence of sustainable
use and reject any killing of whales—based on their own moral reasons—and animal welfare activists are concerned with the human treatment of the whales. Id.
71. See id. at 197.
72. See id. at 198–99. Membership had more than doubled from the original 15 to 39. Id.
73. See id. at 199. For more on the United States’ domestic enforcement of the IWC, see infra
Part III.
74. See Stein, supra note 4, at 169; see also Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 199.
75. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 199.
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supported by scientific evidence.76 In 1991, Norway announced that it
would not hunt any minke whales after it failed to lift the ban on minkes,
and for the first time since the seventeenth century, Norway did not kill
any whales that year.77 In 1992, however, due to the importance Norway
placed on whaling, Norway reversed and announced that it would resume
commercial whaling in 1993. 78 The United States led a fifteen-nation
group in making a formal statement urging Norway to reconsider, but
Norway refused because it was legally within its rights. 79 Since then,
Norway has continued to hunt whales annually, and a variety of attempts
by the United States to bring Norway back under the moratorium have
been largely unsuccessful, as will be discussed in the next Part of this
Note.
III. ANTAGONISTIC PAST AND PRESENT MECHANISMS
This Part discusses why previous attempts to bring Norway into
“compliance” with international law (in the form of the ICRW ban on
whaling) have been ultimately unsuccessful. These previous attempts are
characterized in this Note as “antagonistic” because they did little to seek
compromise. Three general categories of approaches have been attempted so far. First, applying pressure through formal diplomatic channels
has technically worked with Japan 80 but has not been successful with
Norway.81 Second, the United States made attempts to domestically enforce what it viewed as breaches of the purpose of the ICRW, but the
United States Supreme Court effectively shot down that approach.82 Finally, due to problems with the two methods above, the more recent and
controversial approach suggests that effective enforcement of conservationist values can come from private activist parties, ranging from bans
on goods to acts of interference that may rise close to the level of piracy.83 Each of these approaches will be examined in turn.
76. Norwegians Reject Decision to Protect the Minke Whale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985,
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/22/world/norwegians-reject-decision-to-protect-the-minkewhale.html.
77. See Stein, supra note 4, at 169.
78. See id. at 170.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 168–69. Albeit with arguably disastrous results in terms of effectiveness because
Japan simply used the moratorium’s scientific research exception to continue whaling. Id.
81. See, e.g., Halverson, supra note 6, at 147 (“Norway continues to prove it will withstand
threats and criticism in order to maintain Norwegian cultural identity and sovereignty.”).
82. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 222 (1986).
83. Anthony L.I. Moffa, Comment, Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case
Study of Anti-Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 201 (2012). Acts of
violence at sea against Japanese whalers by the private organization Sea Shepherd may constitute
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A. Formal Pressure
The reasons for the United States’ change in policy in the years between the creation of the IWC and the moratorium in 1982—from being
at most a passive bystander to a staunch advocate of a newly emerging
norm—is not entirely clear at first glance. One view is that the United
States saw gains in terms of a “reputational advantage” because simply
opposing the taking of whales was essentially a no-cost means of appearing as a “good environmental citizen” or having “green credentials.”84
There was, however, a cost in pursuing that path in the form of damaged
trade relations, so some argue that the reputation benefit alone does not
account for the normative change in United States policy.85 To some extent, it appears that the shift in the IWC and in the normative policies of
important previous whaling nations, such as the United States and Australia, was due to the work of environmental non-governmental organizations. These organizations influenced the public and world leaders by
pushing concepts, such as the immorality of whaling and the intelligence
of whales, as normative reasons to oppose the practice entirely, instead
of viewing it in terms of utilitarian conservationism.86 This signals that
instead of being merely a strategic choice by the United States, a symptomatic change of identity occurred in the United States.87 Such a change
in identity, this Note posits, helps explain why the United States used its
power as a leader, both in a global sense and within the context of the
IWC, to formally pressure the moratorium dissenters to accept the ban on
whaling. With a majority of the votes in the IWC—and an underlying
impossibility of compromise between preservationist states and environmental non-governmental organizations and conservationist whaling
states and industry88—the United States had little reason to work with the
dissenters. Instead, it formally pressured them against the backdrop of
unrelenting global public opinion against the dissenting whaling states.
The United States applied formal pressure against Japan by certifying Japan under the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman’s Protection Act
of 1967.89 However, because Japan made statements that it was going to
piracy. See Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 725 F.3d 940, 944 (9th
Cir. 2013) (holding the district court erred in dismissing Cetacean’s piracy claims).
84. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 412.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 414–15.
87. See id. at 415.
88. See id.
89. See Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop
Driftnet Fishing and Save the Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON.
477, 484 (1991). The USSR was also certified at the same time. Id.
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improve conservation efforts, President Ford used his power of discretion
in the Amendment to decline to impose actual economic sanctions.90 The
pressure was still technically successful in that Japan did officially withdraw its objection to the 1982 moratorium.91 In terms of practical success, however, it was at best temporary and at worst detrimental because
Japan continues to whale to this day under the guise of “research,” which
is permitted by the ICRW requirement because the carcass is fully utilized after the “research.”92
Norway, on the other hand, was less receptive to formal pressures
from the United States. Although Norway did cease whaling operations
from 1991 to 1993, possibly as the result of United States-led pressure in
the IWC,93 the mere fact that Norway resumed and continues whaling to
the present day demonstrates that any further formal pressure by the
United States is not likely to produce any results that are positive for the
United States’ presumptively long-term goals of preservation. Therefore,
such tactics should be abandoned as they will at best do little but damage
relations with a trading partner and at worst encourage Norway to take
the Japanese approach and begin “researching” whales, which circumvents the spirit of regulation and would only further weaken the IWC.
B. Domestic Enforcement
In conjunction with the United States’ newfound normative approach to whaling, the United States noticed the conspicuous lack of any
enforcement power within the IWC, such that even if Norway were blatantly violating international law by whaling despite the moratorium,
there were no penalties under the IWC scheme.94 As a leader in the international community, the United States Congress took it upon itself to gift
the Executive Branch of the United States with a domestic enforcement
mechanism to threaten dissenters of the moratorium, which came in the
form of the Pelly 95 and Packwood-Magnuson 96 Amendments. The two
amendments give the Secretary of Commerce the ability to determine if
foreign nations are “diminish[ing] the effectiveness” of the ICRW. If so,
90. PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL WHALING OPERA47, 47–48 (Jan. 16, 1975).
91. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 199.
92. See id.
93. See Stein, supra note 4, at 170.
94. See id. at 171.
95. Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman’s Protective Act of 1971, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (Supp.
1988).
96. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1985).
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the Secretary is to certify that fact to the President of the United States,
who may apply sanctions according to the two amendments.97 The Pelly
Amendment gives the President the discretion of banning imports of fish
products from nations that are “reducing the effectiveness” of any international fishery conservation agreement, which would include the
ICRW. 98 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment imposes economic
sanctions in the form of reducing the offending nation’s share of fishing
in U.S. waters, but the Secretary may also certify a nation when it specifically violates the ICRW—thus making Congress’s intent to enforce it
directly clear.99
Two major problems have surfaced in application of the amendments. First, even if a nation is certified, it is within the discretion of the
President to apply Pelly sanctions. Second, the United States Supreme
Court held in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society
that even though the Secretary had the authority to determine whether a
nation’s whaling in excess of quotas diminished the effectiveness of the
IWC, this determination did not impose a mandatory obligation on the
Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily failed that
standard.100 Perhaps as a result of Japan Whaling, the United States has
used the amendments more as negotiating tools to apply formal pressure
than as a direct enforcement mechanism; in fact, the United States only
applied sanctions twice—both times under Packwood-Magnusson, and
never under Pelly.101 Norway itself was certified several times, but neither President George H.W. Bush nor President Bill Clinton ever applied
sanctions, possibly because they did not want to injure trade relations
with Norway.102
Furthermore, some argue that if the United States actually applied
sanctions, it would violate international law by contravening the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a unilateral trade restriction
and possibly violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). 103 Therefore, domestic enforcement through the Pelly
97. See Stein, supra note 4, at 171.
98. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
99. See Halverson, supra note 6, at 128–29.
100. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 231–32 (1986).
101. See Stein, supra note 4, at 172. The first sanction was against the former Soviet Union in
1985, but President Reagan refused to apply Pelly sanctions because he did not think that sanctions
against fish products would encourage the Soviets to change their whaling policy. The second time
was against Japan in 1988, but once again Reagan refused Pelly sanctions because he thought the
100% reduction in fishing allocations in U.S. waters was enough to encourage Japan. Id. at 172–73.
102. See Halverson, supra note 6, at 129.
103. See id. at 129–30. Although UNCLOS does not directly regulate trade, it does preclude
the use of unilateral trade barriers as an aspect of the law of the sea. Id.
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and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments holds little promise in pressuring
Norway to accept the ban, especially since the more stringent trade sanctions are at the discretion of the President, who is often mindful of other
political concerns regarding relations with Norway. Given the inability of
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) to file suit under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments to force the Secretary to certify every quota as a violation, these organizations began to
look for other methods to accomplish their agendas.
C. Private Activism
Due in part to the failure of the above methods to attain preservationist goals, ENGOs have taken a more recognizable role both in shaping the development of international law and in enforcing it through the
use of “activism.”104 ENGOs have taken two general approaches in their
activism: “protest” activism and “interventionist” activism. 105 Protest
activism is an approach favored by ENGOs such as Greenpeace in recent
years and represents a more law-promoting approach through the use of
legal activities—such as consumer boycotts, protests, and awarenessraising campaigns—in order to put indirect pressure on states and international legal organs to effectuate desired policy changes.106 The other
approach, interventionist activism, represents a more vigilante approach
favored by groups such as Sea Shepherd—who has been popularized by
television programming of its activities against Japanese whalers in the
Antarctic—through the use of nearly, if not patently, illegal applications
of direct force to enforce the private views of ENGOs on the content of
international law.107
Protest activism is not very controversial and should even be encouraged because it supports the rule of law in the international regulation of commercial whaling. In comparison to the formal mechanisms of
pressure described above, protest activism arguably has been more successful in effecting change in the whaling industry, at least in Japan.108

104. See Moffa, supra note 83, at 201–02.
105. See id. at 202.
106. See id. at 202–03.
107. See id. at 201–02. Moffa characterizes the Sea Shepherd’s actions as the “direct application of force to implement existing laws and policies.” Id. But it is an exaggeration to claim that the
Sea Shepherds are enforcing anything other than their own misguided beliefs about what constitutes
international law. Cf. Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 725 F.3d 940,
944 (9th Cir. 2013) (“That the perpetrators believe themselves to be serving the public good does not
render their ends public.”).
108. See Moffa, supra note 83, at 207. Greenpeace was able to reduce financing available to
the Japanese whaling industry through boycotts on products imported to the United States because of
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Consumer boycotts and protests are generally protected forms of behavior in the states where they occur. Thus, this form of activism operates
within a legal framework and should be encouraged and accepted under
international law.109
Conversely, interventionist activism is a much more pernicious
threat to the rule of law. Interventionist activism consists of the use of
active harassment of whaling fleets. The effectiveness of this strategy is
demonstrated by the efforts of Sea Shepherd in contributing to an early
close to the 2011 Japanese whaling season in the Southern Ocean.110 Yet,
effectiveness alone should not be the benchmark by which actions are
evaluated, for surely war is a more directly effective means of accomplishing state objectives than diplomatic compromise, yet the international prohibition of aggressive war is well-established. 111 Even those
who support interventionist activism should be aware that it comes with
the price of threatening international rule of law.112 Favored methods of
interventionists include ramming whaling vessels, throwing butyric acid,
disabling propellers, and boarding vessels.113 Such acts were only once
held to constitute piracy as violations of UNCLOS in a Belgian case,114
so there is little precedent to prosecute Sea Shepherd for piracy.115 Furthermore, one of the gravest dangers of interventionists is that they believe they are “enforcing” existing international law by relying on nonbinding declaratory resolutions, such as the World Charter for Nature,
and giving it undue weight as some sort of binding instrument enforceable by private parties—apparently by any means necessary.116 Even assuming that interventionist activism is the most effective means to compel nations like Norway to comply with the ban on commercial whaling
and that there is “global acquiescence towards the Sea Shepherds’ campaign”117 and other similar interventionist actions, the facial illegality of
such approaches is diametrically opposed to the efforts of civilization to
Gorton’s parent company’s ownership stake in a Japanese company that had one of Japan’s infamous “research permits.” Id. at 208–09.
109. See id. at 208.
110. See id. at 209.
111. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, arts. 2(4), 39, 41, 42.
112. See Moffa, supra note 83, at 209.
113. See id.
114. Castle John and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v. NV Mabeco and NV Parfin, 77 I.L.R.
537, 537–41 (Belg. Ct. Cas. 1986).
115. See Moffa, supra note 83, at 210. Whether the United States should reexamine the issue
and exercise universal jurisdiction to hold the Sea Shepherds accountable for acts of piracy in violation of the most ancient of international laws is beyond the scope of this Note.
116 . See id.; see also World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, at 21–24, U.N. DOC.
A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982) (declaring the United Nations’ position on the importance of nature).
117. See Moffa, supra note 83, at 209.
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be ruled by laws and not violence. The United States, as a world leader,
should reject any argument to outsource its IWC compliance efforts to
private ENGOs. Because there are no currently effective legal means
available to the United States to compel Norway to end its commercial
whaling, a new approach is needed where both the long-term environmental goals of the United States and the cultural values of Norway can
both be respected.
IV. A PROPOSED SHIFT TO COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS
The best way for the United States to achieve its own long-term environmental and diplomatic policy goals is to work cooperatively with
Norway to persuade the other members of the IWC to abandon the moratorium in favor of a quota standard that is culturally inclusive and supported by contemporary scientific data. The United States Congress
seems completely opposed to commercial whaling, based on a recent
resolution in which the U.S. House of Representatives proclaimed that
the United States should “use all appropriate measures to end commercial whaling in all of its forms, including scientific and other special
permit whaling . . . .”118 Such statements that refute even scientific purposes strongly indicate an unyielding preservationist attitude. Moreover,
when the United States demands that Norway cease all whaling without
giving anything in return, the preservationist attitude appears merely antagonistic and makes no gains for U.S. policy. The far better choice is for
the United States to work cooperatively to achieve accountable international regulation for Norwegian whaling under the IWC.
As has been discussed so far, the methods used to insist on a total
ban are ineffective and cause tension within the IWC.119 The Scientific
Committee of the IWC caused great tension by reporting that some species are no longer in need of complete protection, which has prompted
pro-whaling members to argue that the complete moratorium is contravening the basic principles of the ICRW.120 Because the IWC is a voluntary international body with little or no enforcement power, continued
insistence on the moratorium could lead to the dissolution of the IWC or
withdrawal of pro-whaling members, some of whom have already begun
to form other organizations.121
118. H.R. Con. Res. 350, 110th Cong. (2008).
119. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 200–01.
120. See id.
121. See Halverson, supra note 6, at 143–44. Iceland withdrew from the IWC in 1992 and
formed the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO); however, Norway did not
contribute to its legitimacy, and Iceland subsequently reapplied for IWC membership in 2001. Id.
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In addition, certain considerations make an agreement on a quota
with Norway particularly appealing.122 First, cooperation is the only way
to achieve compliance in a non-binding international legal scheme such
as the IWC, as there simply is no enforcement mechanism, and straining
pressure on sovereign states can result in their non-compliance or abandonment of the organization. Also, there are strong indications that the
whaling industry in Norway is naturally declining,123 so in the long-term
the United States would have little to lose from supporting a lift of a ban
in terms of environmental policy (assuming that the United States has the
long-term goal of reducing catches to zero). Based on the failure to make
Norway conform to preservationist values, a preservationist-focused
strategy is not the best policy for the United States to pursue if it wants to
bring Norway into “compliance” with the IWC. The United States must
realize that whaling is a source of national pride for Norway—one that it
views as a symbol of its identity and culture, even its sovereignty. 124
Norway has withstood threats and critics in the international community
for three decades, so further attempts at coercion by the United States
will likely be futile.
In 2006, another author of a law review article on this subject had
“no doubt” that the momentum in the IWC had been shifting towards a
lift on the moratorium in the near future, 125 yet seven years later, the
moratorium remains in place. Change will not likely occur without the
support of the United States, who is a key leader in the international
community and within the IWC. Therefore, the United States should shift
its policy from what seems like an antagonistic and preservationist mindset to a cooperative conservation mindset. As long as Norway objects to
the moratorium, it is within its legal rights to continue to hunt whales,
limited only by what its own scientists say is a sustainable quota amount.
To be sure, Norway vigorously contends that its scientists do not lack
integrity,126 which implies that Norway believes it is able to self-regulate
under safe scientific principles, even if the international community is
122. Whether to lift the ban on whaling will be an equally effective option in terms of getting
compliance from Japan is beyond the scope of this Note because Japan has a different cultural background and interest in whaling than Norway.
123. The Norwegian government is subsidizing the whaling industry because it is becoming
unprofitable due to rising costs and declining demand. Whaling Unprofitable, SOUTHLAND TIMES
(NEW ZEALAND), June 20, 2009, at 3.
124. See Halverson, supra note 6, at 146–47.
125. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 219.
126. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway), Norway Protests Against Unfounded Attack (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2ndGovernment/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Nyheter-ogpressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2006/norway
-protests-against-unfounded-attack.html?id=419934.
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unwilling to consider such an approach. Even assuming that Norway’s
research is unbiased, it is still wiser policy for the international regulation
of whaling to be observed by neutral international observers because
whales are a shared global resource. Thus, it is more prudent for the
United States and Norway to compromise on a sustainable quota that can
be governed by an international body.
V. CONCLUSION
Whaling is an ancient practice that has developed in modern times
largely from efforts by Norwegians. Whaling continues today due to
commercial uses and long-held Norwegian cultural values. After nearly
driving whales to extinction, there was a need for regulation of commercial whaling. The failed attempts of industry and domestic regulations
necessitated international regulation, culminating in the ICRW, which
promulgated the IWC to regulate modern whaling. Under the United
States’ leadership, the IWC instituted a ban on all commercial whaling in
1982. Norway objected and stopped whaling for a time, but resumed in
1992 despite international criticism. Norway continues to whale today, in
part, because it views whaling as an important aspect of its cultural identity. Unfortunately, efforts by the United States to urge Norway to accept
the moratorium have failed. The failure of formal pressures with Japan—
which ceased its objection but now whales more controversially by
claiming the research permit exception—indicates that insisting Norway
accept the moratorium will likewise be ineffective. Similarly, attempts
by the United States to enforce its view of the IWC failed domestically
because it relied in large part on the willingness of the United States to
risk relations with an important trade partner by imposing economic
sanctions, which may in itself violate international law regarding free
trade and the seas. Finally, the more effective methods used by ENGOs
and private interest groups, such as Sea Shepherd, are controversial, contrary to the rule of law, and may even amount to piracy. Because all of
these methods have failed, the best option for the United States is to
adopt a cooperative approach with Norway that is centered on reaching
an agreeable quota that is scientifically sustainable. For in this way, the
United States and the international community can hold Norway accountable to ensure that whales—a shared, valuable, and global resource—are not threatened.

